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In The Commons: New Perspectives on Nonprofit Organization,  Voluntary 
Action and Philanthropy, (Jossey-Bass, 1992)  I set forth a theoretical 
interpretation of the essential characteristics of nonprofit organization, 
voluntary action and philanthropy – the wider third sector.   In that work, a 
commons is defined as a social grouping characterized by uncoerced 
voluntary participation, shared purposes and resources and a sense of 
mutuality and fairness.  This category reaches beyond the culture-bound 
nonprofit sector to include such related phenomena as political parties, 
festivals, religious pilgrimages and self-help and mutual aid groups along 
with traditional voluntary sector social agencies.  Excluded are 
entrepreneurial and commercial nonprofit service vendors lacking extensive 
board, committee or volunteer participation. 
The perspective of the commons is the central anchor point of this paper, 
which seeks to: 1) step apart from the assumptions and viewpoints of 
utilitarian, rationalist and social structural interpretations of practice and 
policy in the third sector and 2) affirm and redirect a line of discussion and 
research on practice and policy questions affecting the sector within the 
broad perspective variously identified as dialogical, interactive, interpretive 
or pragmatic.   For easy of understanding, I shall refer to variations in this 
broad view in what follows as the pragmatic perspectives. 
Pragmatic Perspectives 
Pragmatic perspectives are, in all essentials, part of a long-standing tradition 
of nonprofit organization, voluntary action and philanthropic studies.   The 
essentials of pragmatism, or the problem-solving perspective from a policy and 
practice standpoint, include emphasis upon the evaluation of action in terms of 
the consequences of acts; emphasis on the parallel between the scientific method 
and democratic decision processes; and explicit rejection of dualism, particularly 
as it supports different approaches to resolving factual and value problems, the 
selection of means and ends, and the radical distinction of methods of 
understanding what “is” and what “ought to be”.    
At least from the time of John Dewey, pragmatic problem-solving models 
have been important approaches to practice issues in groups, voluntary action, 
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and related questions.  This same perspective figures importantly in a number of 
organizational, management, planning and policy models.    The emphasis on 
democratic action, science and face-to-face interaction of Dewey, Mead, James 
and Pierce also offers a reaffirmation of fundamental values which have always 
been formative in the third sector itself and among researchers and scholars 
interested in studying the sector. 
The perspective of the commons as I have articulated it also seeks to take 
emphasis off large, wealthy and powerful institutions and quasi-commercial 
nonprofit firms as representative of the third sector as a whole.  Instead, the 
theory of the commons places its emphasis on participatory, collective, mutual 
and expressive endeavors, which are often also smaller in scale and scope, in 
control of fewer and more limited resources and generally capable of wielding 
less social influence.   To state the matter in terms of an organic analogy, the 
theory of the commons seeks to locate the “heart and soul” of the third sector in 
self-defining commons.  The skeletal structure of the contemporary commons 
may indeed be provided by the incorporation statutes, tax-policies and service-
contracting strategies of the welfare state.  But the clearest expressions of the 
pursuit of common goods are to be found in the community churches, self-help 
and mutual aid groups, volunteer fire departments, hobby clubs, scientific 
societies and many other clubs, groups, associations and societies.  These are the 
groups which determine for themselves the rules of participation and carry out 
their own purposes, largely unaided by outsiders, using their own resources and 
derive a satisfactory sense of mutuality in the process.  These are also the types of 
groups which the Supreme Court clearly had in mind in its landmark declaration 
of a constitutional right of association in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama.  (1958) 
Such non-coerced, cooperative, mutual, shared fair-play in pursuit of self-
defined common goods is definitive in the third sector.  It is this model of 
common action which nonprofit law recognizes, and tax policy encourages.  It is 
this model of joint action which civics texts and politicians (in their better 
moments) extol.  It is such action which is often referred to as grass-roots and 
community-based.  Regrettably, the paradigmatic role of representing the third 
sector has been to an important degree coopted by the giant foundations, 
national association oligarchies and quasi-commercial nonprofit firms which so 
frequently position themselves to speak in the name of the third sector today.   
So What? 
In formulating the theory of the commons, I chose to defer consideration of 
questions of practice and policy until a basic outline of the nature of the 
commons itself had been set out.   This paper is an effort to re-engage the 
practical issues earlier set aside.   
In the past several years, several unrelated intellectual and practical 
trends have been converging which set the backdrop for this current effort.   
Of particular note has been the resurgence of interest in pragmatism among 
American philosophers and the selective embrace of pragmatism and 
interactional social science by Jürgen Habermas, the heir apparent of 
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European critical theory  (Geuss, 1981; Habermas, 1987).  These matters are 
explored extensively in a Fall, 1992 issue of Symbolic Interaction: The Official 
Journal of the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction.    More than 
anything else, the American dialogues over Habermas have reopened broader 
interest in the potentials of democratic organization and participation which 
have long energized discussions within AVAS/ARNOVA of citizen and client 
participation, volunteerism, collaboration, social democracy, co-production 
and related matters. 
Guided by such traditional and contemporary concerns, the objectives of a 
suitable project to explore the policy and practice implications of the theory of 
the commons can be summarized as follows:  
- To recapture the radical democratic practice and policy implications 
of Charles S. Pierce’s pragmatic model of scientific community and 
John Dewey’s model of democratic community and apply them to 
understanding of the commons;  
- To operationalize the convergence of objectivist and relativist 
perspectives which Richard Bernstein and others see in the critical 
theory of Jürgen Habermas;  (Bernstein, 1983) 
- To move toward a vigorous, pragmatic critical theory which is also 
non-Marxist, neo-Hegelian as the basis for fundamental social 
criticism and social reconstruction;  
- And ultimately to rediscover and embrace a vigorous model of civil 
society consisting of an integrated community of emancipated and 
enlightened citizens in unconstrained interaction and dialogue. 
Pragmatic approaches to policy concerned with addressing this broad 
middle ground will likely offer major alternatives to both the discredited 
doctrines of state-socialism and the highly-fashionable but equally dubious 
doctrines of anti-statist individualism, social Darwinism and laissez-faire 
market economics which erupted back into political fashion in the 1980’s 
after nearly a century of well-deserved neglect. 
Social Policy and Practice Defined 
An approach to policy as determining the ends of collective action in civil 
society and practice as concern for the ways and means of attaining those ends 
are fundamental to examination of the above objectives.   Therefore, before we 
can proceed further with any of these considerations, some clarification of the 





Nearly three decades ago the economist Kenneth Boulding defined social 
policy in the following manner: “If there is one common thread that unites all 
aspects of social policy and distinguishes them from merely economic policy, it is 
the thread of what has elsewhere been called the ‘integrative system’.  This 
includes those aspects of social life that are characterized not so much by 
exchange in which a quid is got from a quo as by unilateral transfers that are 
justified by some kind of appeal to a status or legitimacy, identity or community.  
The institutions with which social policy is especially concerned, such as the 
school, family, church, or at the other end, the public assistance office, court, 
prison, or criminal gang, all reflect degrees of integration and community.  By 
and large, it is the objective of social policy to build the identity of a person 
around some community with which it is associated.”  (Boulding, 1967.) 
We can surmise that a concern with “building the identity of a person around 
some community with which it is associated” offers at least an initial 
approximation of the process which occurs more or less spontaneously in all 
genuinely common action.  This is also what several generations of social policy 
architects have sought to capture and harness for some larger social good with 
the Community Action Program, ACTION, Model Cities, the Older Americans 
Act and numerous other public programs.   
In the prevailing rationalist and positivist models  of policy and practice 
widely in vogue today, any concern of social policy for integration and the 
furthering of community is usually translated into largely technical and 
instrumental terms.   Massive breakdowns of human communication and 
understanding like the riots in Los Angeles surprise us even as their underlying 
causes elude us.  Rather than a common, mutual search for individual identity 
and shared community, social policy has been reduced to an endless quest for 
the most efficient and effective means to achieve pre-determined or fixed ends 
projected to be beyond the reach of common debate or control.    
Despite numerous critiques, the stream of rationalist instrumentalism runs 
very deep and wide in contemporary social policy thinking.  Even the venerable 
British social policy analyst Richard Titmuss, fell victim to its influence in his 
widely quoted definition of policy: “The word policy can be taken to refer to the 
principles that govern action directed toward given ends.” (emphasis added) 
(Titmuss, 1976, ) 
Such a view of social policy as principally concerned with spelling out the 
means for attaining pre-determined or given ends is completely inconsistent with 
the reality of much contemporary social legislation.  What Robert Binstock calls 
“new welfare” legislation is typically characterized by vague, general objectives 
and impossibly broad and global intentions: eliminating poverty; cleaning up the 
environment; ending family violence or rebuilding the cities.  (Binstock, 1971, 
personal communication)  Interestingly, in many instances over the past three 
decades, such sweeping policy objectives are declared by the state and then 
subcontracted to nonprofit organizations for implementation.   This may be, as is 
often suggested, a massive buck-passing exercise on the part of timid, self-
serving politicians.  Even so, it is also a recognition of the norm-building and 
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consensus generating capabilities of common action.    Real commons are capable 
of creating genuine, plausible, authentic ends and engaging in coordinated action 
in pursuit of such common goods.  This may involve the organization and 
celebration of a community festival or  a self-regulating science devoted to 
knowledge building in a particular field, as well as groups and associations 
devoted to defining, locating and solving all manner of community problems. 
In any case, the ability of all types of nonprofit organizations, voluntary 
associations and philanthropic endeavors to identify mutually acceptable ends in 
a manner which reinforces and even increases levels of integration and solidarity 
among members is one of the most interesting and fascinating aspects of the 
commons.    At the same time, one of the strongest points of pragmatic theory 
has always been the ability to evaluate ends in terms of means and means in light 
of ends which it offers. 
The Grandstand View 
Another related major issue in contemporary social policy is the tendency 
to adopt the grandstand view of rational policy and practice models.   This is 
evident, for example, in the definition of social policy offered by David Gil.  
“Social policies are principles or courses of action designed to influence the 
overall quality of life in a society, the circumstances of living of individuals 
and groups in that society, and the nature of intra-societal relationships 
among individuals, groups and society as a whole.”  (Gil, 1992.)   
Yet, where are these privileged souls who stand apart from the society 
they presume to judge, even as they seek to influence, even control? The 
notion that anyone casting themselves in the role of a social policy analyst 
can sit apart from and observe from some objective vantage point the “overall 
quality of life of a society” as well as the full range of circumstances of living 
and the relationships among members of that society is a clear expression of 
such a grandstand view.  The pragmatic view is quite something else: A view 
of social policy analysis as one of a number of divergent, even competing, 
streams of influence seeking to affect the ongoing conversation that is social 
policy. 
Social Practice 
Any concern for social practice is at least partly a concern for deliberate 
acts in which purpose, intent and direction are major issues.   The social 
practices associated with forming, operating and working within nonprofit 
organization, voluntary action and philanthropy were once generally 
interpreted from a pragmatic viewpoint which simultaneously emphasized 
the micro-social view of intelligent group action and the macro-social view of 
constructing democratic community life.   More recently, however, many 
social practice approaches on the third sector have been dominated by social 
technology and “applied science” perspectives which place primary or 
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exclusive preoccupation on the mastery of method and technique for attaining 
fixed ends through the application of positive knowledge.   
It is of interest, therefore, that one of Habermas’ most fundamental 
criticisms of modern society involves the displacement of praxis in the sense 
of action to further the good and just life, by techne, or the expert mastery of 
objectified tasks  (Bernstein, 1983).  Such a technical view is entirely 
consistent with a social work which places primary emphasis on the means 
for attaining established ends, and which seeks to evaluate policy primarily 
in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of attaining those ends.   It is also 
entirely consistent with a grandstand view of society which places the policy 
analyst or advocate outside the flow of action.   
Entirely consistent with models of social policy which emphasize means 
over ends and the grandstand viewpoint of the policy analyst and developer is 
the emerging positivistic model of social practice as “policy implementation.”  
Another expression of this view is the often-heard notion of social practice as 
“applied social science.”  In both cases, social practice is conceived as a follow-
up activity which proceeds from or develops out of research and/or policy-
making in which the objective insights of research are applied to “the real 
world”. 
In many contemporary articulations of this view, the basic operations of 
nonprofit organizations and voluntary associations and many practice 
communities found in the third sector in the arts, social services, health care 
and other fields are subjected to a kind of correspondence theory: The lived 
experiences of those commons and the theoretical, conception and empirical 
knowledge of those commons possessed by social scientists are fashioned as 
the parallel universes of "theory" and "reality" in which research-based 
theoretical knowledge can be directly, unproblematically and unequivocally 
“applied” to future acts in what is usually termed “the real world.” 
One of the most telling criticisms that can be leveled at contemporary 
third sector perspectives is the relative absence (or perhaps the restricted 
influence) of genuinely political perspectives in this rational-technical world 
view.  The profoundly political (or, civic) nature of nonprofit, voluntary and 
philanthropic decision and action is either ignored entirely, or treated as one, 
among many competing paradigms. 
Policy, Practice and Intelligence 
In contrast to other perspectives, including traditional critical theory, 
pragmatic perspectives on policy and practice in the commons downplay the 
importance of rational decisions, particularly as defined by the rational 
method, and substitute instead the importance of rational as well as the 
irrational considerations including ethics, emotions, intuition and aesthetics.  
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“The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is 
to project new and more complex ends -- to free experience from routine and 
caprice.  Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given in the 
mechanism of the body or in the extant state of society but the use of 
intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson.”  
(Dewey, 1917, p. 63f)   
In contemporary social policy discussions, various efforts have come close 
to capturing the essential characteristics of the pragmatic theory of 
intelligence within the technical language of policy analysis.   Charles 
Lindblom’s models of “disjointed incrementalism” or “muddling through” and 
“strategic analysis” capture the essential pragmatic qualities of precedent, 
process and context implicit in Dewey’s and other pragmatic viewpoints.   
Herbert Simon’s emphasis on rational decision-making under conditions of 
partial and insufficient information and the perspectival limits implicit in the 
concept of “satisficing” are also largely consistent with the viewpoint of 
Dewey and his colleague George Herbert Mead of intelligence grounded 
concretely in social life. 
Richard Bernstein, in particular, has been forthright in proclaiming the 
emergence of “a new sensibility and universe of discourse. . . which sought to 
interpret dialectically the empirical, interpretive and critical dimensions of a 
theoretical orientation that is directed toward practical activity.”  (Bernstein, 
1983, p. x; Bernstein, 1976)   Bernstein’s (1983) argument, as well as his title, 
characterizes this emergent paradigm as a movement Beyond Objectivism 
and Relativism.   A principal inspiration for  The Commons (Lohmann, 1992) 
was Bernstein’s view of  a growing convergence of Marxian-Hegelian critical 
theory with American pragmatism and British-American analytical 
philosophy in the work of Jurgen Habermas.   This viewpoint was reinforced 
(and the draft of this paper considerably delayed) by the recent publication of 
a special issue of Symbolic Interaction, devoted entirely to examination of 
convergences in Habermas’ work between critical theory and pragmatism.  
The remainder of this paper is devoted to exploring the implications of some 
of those themes for social policy and practice in the commons.   
Critical Theory 
My interest here is less in applying European critical theory, ala 
Habermas, to the study of the commons than in exploring the implications 
and potentials of the pragmatic critical theory which has been unearthed by 
Habermas’ approach.  What Habermas’ does is bring into “sharp focus the 
critical dimension of pragmatism, its interest in emancipation, freedom of 
communications and equalization of participatory rights.”  (Joas, 1992, p. ?)   
Please note that these are precisely the values which have traditionally 
energized the "voluntary action" tradition to which the theory of the commons 
is most responsive.   
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 Many of the concepts found scattered throughout Habermas’ work, 
appear to be fraught with interesting implications for the policy and practice 
of nonprofit organization, voluntary action and philanthropy.   However, the 
overall goals of critical theory -- emancipation and enlightenment--are 
particularly relevant in the context of the commons.  That is, provided they 
can be meaningfully transliterated out of the Hegelian context and into the 
pragmatic world of daily life in the commons; a task which Habermas has 
already begun.   (It is interesting to note also that Habermas' use of the 
pragmatists is the latest chapter in an on-going trans-Atlantic dialogue.  
Both John Dewey and George Herbert Mead studied in Germany in the late 
19th century, and Dewey in particular acknowledged his indebtedness to 
Hegel.) 
In moving critical theory beyond conventional Marxism and Freudianism  
and by embracing the American pragmatic tradition,  Habermas has helped 
to clarify that critical theory is not the monopoly of European Marxians and 
Hegelians.  Critical theory, as a concern for emancipation through critique 
might be more accurately rendered in English as “expanding social, political 
and economic freedom through  social criticism”.  As such, it is a long-
standing component of pragmatism.   Indeed, American social thinkers 
working in and near the pragmatic tradition from Jane Addams, John Dewey 
and Thorsten Veblen to C. Wright Mills, as well as their predecessors from 
Jonathan Edwards and Ralph Waldo Emerson, have established venerable 
American traditions of social criticism.  In this context, the popular image of 
Dewey, Mead and the other pragmatists as status-quo oriented consensus 
seekers is seriously wide of the mark, as numerous commentators have noted. 
Even more relevant to our purpose are the traditional roles of criticism  by 
the third sector.   Foundations, non-profit community protest groups, reform, 
abolition and counter-culture societies, and many other types of commons 
have long been the point of origin of such critiques.  Indeed, it is almost an 
axiom of American democracy that changes in governmental social policy 
almost always originate with some type of group or association outside of 
government in the “third sector”.  Thus, at least from the time of the 
Protestant Reformation and probably earlier as well, commons have served 
as a principal locus for fundamental social criticism. 
Critical theory, however, is according to its adherents more than a 
sociology of social problems. (Geuss, 1982)   According to the critical theorists, 
critique, in order to be considered effective, must be a prelude to liberation 
and enlightenment.  The first is generally presented as release from 
oppressive social and political conditions.  This is largely the domain of social 
policy from the vantage point of pragmatic critical theory, although there are 
also important practice implications to this as well.   Particularly in the 
context of the vexing problems of institutional racism, gender politics and the 
growing body of special interests alleging a wide variety of privileged claims 
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on the public good, the possibilities of utilizing the potential for liberation to 
critically evaluate such claims ought to be taken seriously.  Indeed, there 
may be no more succinct way of understanding the legitimate demands of 
African-Americans for an end to racism and for the legitimate demands of 
women for full equality and social participation.  A vigorous pragmatic 
conception of liberation, however, would need to  be stripped of the polemical 
cant of vulgar Marxism in which it is often wrapped on American campuses 
today.  When liberation in a pragmatic guise, for example, is removed from 
the Hegelian trappings of false consciousness, Geist  and the labor theory of 
value, and evaluated directly in terms of the consequences of oppressive 
social and political conditions on the lives of the oppressed and their 
oppressors, it has the potential to both complement and extends existing lines 
of social problems inquiry. 
According to the critical theorists, enlightenment is a matter of improved 
self-awareness and more accurate perception or consciousness of one’s actual 
circumstances together with full acceptance of those conditions.  This is the 
proper domain of practice, although there are obvious policy implications to 
this as well.  This is the point, in particular, where we may feel bogged down 
in the heavy burdens of Hegelian metaphysics and begin to feel oppressed by 
such Germanic neologisms as the distinction of different forms of power (e.g., 
Macht and Herrschaft).     
Perhaps most interesting of all the potential implications which might 
arise from a pragmatic critical theory applied to the commons is the linkages 
which Habermas is pointing toward between the macro-social level of 
institutions and the social order and the micro-social worlds of everyday life 
and interaction.   It is precisely in this domain in-between where the 
“intermediate” institutions of the commons are most likely to be found.   Yet, 
this is one of the most difficult points to encounter today, in a world where 
social policy is most often regarded as the program or ideology justifying or 
explaining social structure and practice is viewed as concerned only with 
means of attaining sacrosanct ends.   
According to Shalin (1992, 255), Habermas “pins his hopes for 
emancipation on the fact that the ossified social order can be deciphered and 
transcended on the micro-level, in routine symbolic interactions, where 
oppressive structures are reproduced in the structures of interpersonal 
communication.”   Critical theory thus points to  potential major linkages 
between the “micro-social” levels of interpersonal communication.  Moreover, 
it is one in which the clubs, associations and other commons of civil society 
have traditionally figured large.   
Habermas spurs us to recall that Dewey was foremost among the 
pragmatists in articulating a political edge to what is often misconstrued as 
pragmatism as an apolitical set of doctrines.  As constructed by Dewey, the 
political program of pragmatism places central importance on democracy and 
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the political role of the common good.  Dewey’s political program began in the 
pragmatic observation that non-state processes of collective (that is, common) 
action encounter problems and experience unanticipated or unintended 
consequences which the acting collective then has to process reflexively.  
(Joas, 1993, 268)    
Habermas also helps us to recall that in the pragmatic political view, the 
methods of intelligent action in science and politics are inextricably related.  
In the Deweyian view, the conditions of acquiring scientific knowledge are 
essentially the same as the conditions for establishing democratic 
community.  
Conclusion  
The underlying social policy imperative of the theory of the commons 
should be seen as nothing less than a renaissance of the Deweyian objective 
of recreating the endangered democratic public sphere by revitalizing 
community life.  This is what citizen participation and community 
development and coproduction are (or should be) all about.   Before the 
emancipatory and enlightening objectives of critical theory can be genuinely 
understood and applied to policy and practice in the context of the American 
commons, however, it must be translated fully out of the Marxian-Hegelian 
perspective in which it arose, and into the pragmatic context.   The 
fundamental dynamic can be cast as an on-going dialogue:  Habermas, the 
German social critic, has a great deal of interest to say in his restatement of 
critical theory under the influence of the American pragmatists.  However, in 
order for full understanding of the import of Habermas' message to be applied 
to policy and practice in the commons, that message must be translated back 
into the American social and cultural context out of which pragmatism 
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